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NOTE AND COMMENT
CONTRACT OF INFANT-EVIDENCE, COMP=zNCY Or WIrTNESS UNDER SUR-
VIVORSHIP STATUTS.-Two questions are presented by the case of Sigiaigo v.
Signaigo, (Mo. ii8), 2o5 S. W. Rep. 23: First, the enforcibility of the con-
tract of an infant, fully performed by her, to live with a man and his wife
as their adopted child so long as they should live, in consideration that the
infant should have all the property of the foster parents upon their death;
and Second, the competency of the consenting mother of the infant to testify
in support of the infant's claim.
The proceeding was one in equity for the partition among his heirs at law,
of the lands of which David Signaigo died seized. Edna Amrein was made
a party on her petition setting up a claim to the lands under the contract
above referred to. It was conceded that deceased died intestate and without
having taken any formal steps to adopt the said Edna; that she did live with
the said David Signaigo and his wife from the time she was fourteen years
old, that being the time of the making of the contract, until the death of the
said David some nine years later, his wife having pre-deceased him but a
few months, and that no steps had been taken to actually transfer the title of
his property to the said Edna.
The first question would seem not difficult of solution through the applica-
tion of general principles quite well recognized by the courts of Missouri.
In but one case is the infant's contract invalid because he is an infant, and
that is where the contract is palpably to his injury, a proposition too elemen-
tary for the citation of authoritieg. There is nothing which marks this con-
tract as belonging to this class.
The dissenting opinion proceeds upon the theory that the contract is one
for adoption only, and that the only possible parties to such a contract are
the natural and the adopting parents. And apparently forgetting lhat traffic
in human beings is now unlawful, regards the infant as only the "subject
matter" of the contract, and concludes that what the child may actually do
toward the making of such a contract, or in performance of its terms, can-
not affect its legal status.
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The contract as found by the jury whose findings were adopted by the
court, was something more than one for the adoption of the child. By its
terms it provided that she should live with Signaigo and his wife so long as
they should live, and at their death should have all his, Signaigo's property.
Such a contract, if fully performed by the infant, will be enforced in equity
through a decree for specific performance: Sharkey v. McDermott, 91 Mo.
647; Healy v. Simpson, 113 Mo. 340; Martin v. Martin, 250 Mo. 539; Craw-
ford v. Wilson, 139 Ga. 654; Wright v. Wright, 99 Mich. 170; Odenbreit v.
Uthehn, 131 Minn. 56; Van Duyne v. Van Duyne, 12 N. J. Eq. i42; Van
Tine v. Van Tine, N. J. Eq., i5 Atl. 249; Jordan v. Abney, 97 Tex. 296.
And it certainly would be no defense to the enforcement of such a con-k,.
tract that the opposite parties had been guilty of a breach of their own
undertaking by refusing to take the formal steps to adopt the infant: Starnes
v. Hatcher, 121 Tenn. 330.
No question is raised as to the right of the child to take steps to enforce
her rights under the contract, upon the theory that it is only a contract for
her benefit and not one to which she is a party, and no discussion is given
here of the question of her right so to do. The general rule would permit it.
Gandy v. Gandy, 3o L. R. Ch. Div. 57.
The question of evidence arose upon an objection to the competency of
the mother of Edna to testify in support of the claimed agreement, such
objection being based upon the following statute:
"No person shall be disqualified as a witness in any civil suit or proceed-
ing at law or in equity, by reason of his interest in the event of the same,
as a party or otherwise, but such interest may be shown for the purpose of
affecting his credibility: Provided, that in actions where one of the original
parties to the contract or cause of action in issue and on trial is dead or is
shown to the court to be insane, the other party to such contract or cause
of action shall not be admitted to testify either in his own favor or in favor
of any party to the action claiming under him, and no party to such suit or
proceeding whose right of action or defense is derived to him from one who
is, or if living would be, subject to the foregoing disqualification, shall be
admitted to testify in his own favor, except as in this section is provided."
Rxv. STAT. Mo. i9og, § 6354.
The prevailing opinion allows the testimony of the mother upon the
theory that this statute does not disqualify one as a witness because he is the
survivor of two or more parties to a contract, if he actually were such sur-
vivor, nor because he may have an interest in the popular sense; if that in-
terest be not such as would give rise to some right which the law would
recognize, a financial or a pecuniary interest. That the only case in which
a witness is disqualified is that one where the surviving party to a contract or
cause of action is called to testify in his own favor, or in favor of one
claiming under him.
This theory assumes that the language, "the other party to such contract
or cause of action" is but descriptive of the person who may be disqualified,
and disqualified only, if he is called to testify in his own favor, or in favor of
one who claims through him. It is argued that the mother was not called to
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testify in her own favor, nor was her daughter, in support of whose con-
tention she was called to testify, claiming through her. The mother was not.
a party to the cause, she never had the interest which the daughter is seeking
now to enforce, and the daughter therefore can not now be claiming
through her.
It is clear upon general principles, that the "proviso" of the statute, being
in derogation of its general purpose, which is to eliminate the common law
doctrine of disqualification for interest, should bear a strict construction, if
that be necessary to uphold the general purpose of the statute. The language
here is so unambiguous however that it scarcely seems necessary to invoke
this principle. It is universally recognized, that the interest which disqualifes,
under the old rule disqualifying for interest, with a single exception, is a
financial, pecuniary or proprietary interest. The single exception is in the
case of husband and wife, an exception which seems to have had its roots in
the doctrine, indorsed if not fathered, by Lord Coxr, that the effect of mar-
riage was to destroy the personality of the parties to it: GILBnR's EV1D4NCE,
133. A" parent was not disqualified for the reason alone that his child was a
party, whether called to testify for or against him. See, WIGMORZS EVIDtNaC,
§ 6oo; McNALLY's EVIDENC*, 182. It was only because the witness stood in
such relation to the controversy as that he might be advantaged pecuniarily
or in some property right, that he was disqualified for interest The conclu-
sion is irresistible that one cannot testify in his own favor who has no in-
terest to favor. No more can he testify in favor of one claiming through or
under him except that other's right he is seeking to assert comes through or
under the witness.
With this conclusion that the term "favor" as used in the statute, has
reference only to favor having its stimulus in some pecuniary or proprietary
interest, the conclusion results almost without argument, that the mother was
not disqualified for this reason, for there is nothing upon which to base a
claim that she ever had any such interest.
The dissenting opinion proceeds upon the theory that the mother was
disqualified because a party to the contract, the opposite party to which was
dead. The party, like the one interested, was at the common law disqualified.
The statute removes that disqualification of the party because he is a party,
as it does the disqualification of one interested because he is interested, save
only that the disqualification still remains if the party is called to testify in
his own favor and the opposite party to the contract or cause of action is dead
or insane. The witness in this case was not called so to testify, for as pre-
viously shown, she had not then, and never had had, any interest to favor.
The case of Crawford v. Wilson, supra, is one in which a contract similar
to the one involved in this Signaigo case was under investigation. The
arrangement was first made with the grandmother, subsequently adopted by
the mother and carried out by the child. The child brought the action and
called the grandmother and mother to establish the contract. Objection to
their competency was pressed under the CIvZI, CoDe or TFNNESEI, § 5858,
which is similar to the Missouri statute, and they were both held competent
upon the theory of lack of interest. V. II. L.
